omnipresent resourcing problem (manpower, equipment, foodstuffs) , and especially two chapters on the Army of Tennessee as "a band of brothers" and the influence of "that ole time religion" via revivalism amongst the troops as well as a teasing thrust of how all this fit with a rise of Confederate nationalism along the way. So too with the medical and logistical support where some solid monographs and focused studies in recent years have illumined the recesses of forging a Confederate fighting machine. Much of Daniel's strong suit derives particularly from his dredging archives and collections for original sources, adroit quotation and application of such material to his theses and his quest (seen in his previous work) for bringing the Army of Tennessee alive to us. That organization did function with a different chemistry, organizational culture, focus, and purpose than Marse Robert's equally representative eastern Confederate army. Yet, put bluntly, neither Daniel nor Glatthaar have sufficiently explained the role and story of African-Americans in either, aside from say, Daniel's almost obligatory chapter 19 on "Cleburne, Blacks and the Politics of Race," or, for that matter, women as part of the army's supportive fabric. Is that forever destined to elude integrative, comprehensive Confederate military history?
Do we really need twenty-three chapters plus epilogue to essentially carry the Army of Tennessee (and its predecessors) only to the moment of its crescendo disaster in John Bell Hood's Tennessee 1864 campaign? After all, most Civil War historians (southern and northern) would culminate the saga with John Schofield's bulldog decimation of the flower of an expectant Army of Tennessee at Franklin and George H. Thomas's masterful juggernaut thereafter that swept the supple hills and vales south of Nashville and virtually annihilated ten pages; their foe as an organized fighting force on the retreat back to Alabama. Daniel glances that distasteful part of the odyssey with a scant ten pages; it surely warrants thrice that to explain "Conquered!"
The South might look forever for some faulknerian Roland, but the experiment in Rebellion was over and as Lincoln himself sagely observed the usefulness of the Confederacy's other army was over after Franklin/Nashville. The specter of Appomattox might be seen in the sleet and mud of December Middle Tennessee. Essays in a forthcoming Oxford University Press anthology may ultimately better integrate war and society in the Army of Tennessee's battles and campaigns, leaders and followers. Ultimately, its responsibilities were too diverse, its geography too large, its distance to the center of Confederate gravity -Richmond as capital and command and mobilization center -too great. Or "Conquered" as explanation may nest in that droll thought 2 Civil War Book Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2019] , Art. 5 https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol21/iss3/5 DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.21.3.05 from an embittered General George Armstrong Pickett on Rebel defeat. He always thought the Yankees had something to do with it. That said, Daniel's volume must take its rightful place as the study of an army, building ultimately to a new generation of work such as promised by Peter Carmichael, Caroline Janney and Aaron-Sheehan-Dean's Civil War America series of which it is a part.
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